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Corporate Governance Regulation, Legal Origin and Small Business 
Access to Credit: A Cross-European Comparison 
 
Abstract 
In this cross-European study, we investigate the impact of two specific corporate governance 
mechanisms (shareholder rights and regulations on related-party transactions) on firms’ 
decision to apply for credit and the banks’ lending decision. We argue that this impact is 
contingent upon the legal origin that shapes the regulatory institutional setting in which the 
corporate governance mechanisms are embedded. We perform a cross-European comparison 
based on 45,596 firm-level observations from 13 countries. Logit regression reveals that 
corporate governance does not directly influence the banks' lending decision or the firms' 
decision to apply for credit. Rather, the impact of corporate governance on firms’ credit 
access unfolds through regulatory institutional contexts that are shaped only by specific legal 
origins. Our findings help to explain why firms in different countries are financed so 
differently by highlighting the relevance of the embeddedness of corporate governance 
mechanisms in regulatory institutional settings. For research, our findings call for more multi-
level work. For business practice, our findings imply that a well-designed governance regime 
regarding shareholder protection can foster firms’ access to bank finance, and thus innovation 
and economic growth. For legislators, we highlight the importance of ensuring a fit between 
corporate governance mechanisms and the specifics of the national regulatory environment. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Credit Access, Legal Origin, Europe, Comparison 
 
Introduction 
Corporate governance mechanisms and their effects differ considerably across 
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different countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1998). Well-
functioning corporate governance, which is concerned with ensuring that those who supply 
finance to businesses get a return on their investment (Shleifert & Vishny, 1997), mitigates – 
amongst other things – the risk that managers will cheat the shareholders and that the 
controlling shareholders will cheat the minority shareholders. Thus, corporate governance is 
crucial for the sustainable success of a firm. As only successful firms are able to repay their 
loans, banks should also consider corporate governance regulations when taking their lending 
decisions.  
The role of corporate governance in banks’ financing of firms has attracted substantial 
scholarly attention in the past. Previous studies have focused on the impact of corporate 
governance on the external financing of firms (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998), the 
cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, & and Reeb, 2004; Fields, Fraser, & Subrahmanyam, 2012; 
Francis, Hasan, Koetter, & Wu, 2012; Klock, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2005; Sengupta, 1998) 
credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006), loan sizes and maturities (Lin, 
Chen, & Yen, 2014), and bond covenant restrictions (Qi, Roth, & Wald, 2011). While these 
studies aim to shed light on the effect of corporate governance on the terms and conditions of 
bank lending, the intriguing question of whether and how corporate governance impacts on 
firms’ access to bank credit has remained rather opaque. Hope, Thomas, & Vyas (2011) were 
the first to explore the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ access to bank 
credit. We advance this stream of research on credit access by investigating the impact of two 
specific corporate governance mechanisms that address the conflicts of interests between 
shareholders and debt holders: (i) mechanisms aimed at mitigating agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers (i.e. shareholder rights), and (ii) mechanisms aimed at mitigating 
conflicts between minority shareholders, controlling shareholders and managers (i.e. 
regulations on related-party transactions). We examine the effects of shareholder rights and 
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regulations concerning related-party transactions on the firm’s ability to obtain credit, by 
looking at two different scenarios: first, when the firm obtains the loan it applies for, and 
second, when the firm is discouraged from applying for a loan because it fears a rejection by 
the bank. However, it has been shown that the power of specific corporate governance 
mechanisms is contingent on the regulatory institutional setting in which they are embedded 
and through which they are enforced (Beck & Lavine, 2003; La Porta et al., 1998; Nakajima, 
1999a, 1999b). Thus, we also account for the legal origins that shape countries’ regulatory 
institutional settings (Reynolds & Flores, 1989) and perform a cross-European comparison 
based on over 45,596 firm-level observations from 13 countries grouped into four clusters, 
each with distinct legal origins. 
Our logit regression reveals that corporate governance does not directly influence the 
banks' lending decision or the firms' decision to apply for credit. Rather, the impact of 
corporate governance on firms’ credit access unfolds through regulatory institutional contexts 
that are shaped only by certain legal origins. Our findings add another jigsaw piece to the 
“corporate governance puzzle” (La Porta et al., 1998) of why firms in different countries are 
financed so differently. First, we extend the investigation of the direct effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms and the regulatory institutional setting on firms’ access to external 
finance by tracing the effects across these two levels. By doing so, we test for the effects of 
the specific corporate governance mechanisms embedded in the regulatory institutional 
setting and gain a more comprehensive insight into the interplay of the two levels of analysis. 
Second, our analysis builds on a unique and rich multi-source dataset, which allows us to tap 
the full potential of a more fine-grained analysis at the firm level. For business practice, our 
findings imply that, with a well-designed governance regime regarding shareholder 
protection, policy makers can influence firms’ access to bank finance, and thus innovation 
and economic growth, in a favourable way. Our results call for corporate governance regimes 
5 
 
that account for the embeddedness in the specific regulatory institutional setting. Legislators 
can glean from our results the need to ensure a flexible adoption of specific regulations that 
are imposed, for example, by supranational entities, to suit the specific characteristics of the 
national regulatory environment.  
 
2. Theoretical background and development of hypotheses 
Bank debt is a major source of firms’ financing. Due to the economic importance of 
bank loans, a growing stream of literature explores the determinants of bank loan contracting. 
Both the access to bank loans and the price and non-price terms of the loan contract 
essentially depend on the probability that firms will default on their debt obligation and the 
degree of bank protection provided in such an event (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003). Protection 
can be granted by covenants, guarantees or the legal environment. As recommended by 
Filatotchev and Wright (2011), we take an agency theoretical perspective. Theoretical papers 
emphasize that, in order to compensate for higher default risk, banks are more likely to 
increase interest rates and tighten non-price terms when the firm’s information risks and/or 
agency risks are severe (Rajan & Winton, 1995).  
Information risks and agency risks impact the likelihood that a firm will default on its 
credit. Information risk represents the risk that firm managers are hiding relevant information 
that could show lending to the firm to be riskier than is perceived by the bank. Under greater 
information risk, banks face greater uncertainty when assessing a firm’s creditworthiness. 
The agency risk manifests itself in two different ways (Ge, Kim, & Song, 2012): First, 
conflicts of interests between managers and external stakeholders, such as banks, may arise. 
Managers may act self-interestedly and aim at maximizing their personal wealth at the 
expense of external stakeholders. From the banks’ point of view, such behaviour may 
increase the probability of the firm defaulting on its credit (Lin et al., 2014). Second, conflicts 
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of interests between shareholders and debt holders may occur. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that shareholders have an incentive to engage in investments with the potential for high 
returns but little chance of success as soon as a debt contract has been put in place. This is 
because shareholders will receive most of the returns if the investment succeeds, but the 
creditor will have to bear most of the costs if the investment fails (John & Senbet, 1998). 
Further, shareholders have an incentive to underinvest in projects with a positive net present 
value when they believe that most of the returns will be received by the creditor (Myers, 
1977). In either case, the shareholders’ behaviour will impair the bank’s position as it will 
increase the firm’s probability of default.  
Previous research suggests that corporate governance mechanisms affect both 
information and agency risks and, as a consequence, may impact on the price and non-price 
terms of loan contracts. More precisely, corporate governance mechanisms aimed at 
improving corporate transparency should be able to reduce information asymmetries between 
managers and banks. The findings of Sengupta (1998), who explores the impact of corporate 
disclosure on the cost of debt, are in line with this reasoning: He provides evidence that high 
disclosure quality contributes to lower interest costs. Also Cumming and Knill (2012)  in their 
global study report a positive effect of disclosure requirements on  the supply of venture 
capital.  Similarly, Anderson et al. (2004) document that the independence and size of the 
board of directors and audit committee are negatively related to the cost of debt. This 
suggests that characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee increase the 
reliability of financial reports and, thus, decrease information asymmetries. Hope et al. (2011) 
provide evidence that greater credibility of financial statements eases firms’ perceived 
financing constraints. 
Further, corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate agency problems between 
managers and debt holders by strengthening the monitoring of managers and confining the 
7 
 
managers’ self-dealing activities (Ge et al., 2012). The findings of Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003) suggest that firms with better corporate governance mechanisms, i.e. stronger outside 
control of the board and greater institutional ownership, are rewarded with lower bond yields. 
With regard to bank lending, previous research documents that firms with higher-quality 
boards of directors, reflected e.g. by board independence, board size or longer director tenure, 
benefit from higher credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006), lower loan spreads (e.g., 
(Fields et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2012) and both larger loan sizes and longer maturities (Lin 
et al., 2014). Further, Lo, Wong, and Firth (2010) provide evidence that the probability that a 
firm will engage in transfer price manipulations decreases when its board consists of 
relatively more independent directors and fewer directors representing the parent company, 
when the firm’s CEO and chair positions are occupied by different people, and when the 
firm’s audit committee includes financial experts.  
 Whereas previous research documents that corporate governance mechanisms are able 
to reduce information asymmetries and agency problems between firms’ managers and banks, 
empirical evidence suggests that corporate governance mechanisms are not suitable for 
resolving conflicts of interests between shareholders and debt holders. This is because 
corporate governance mechanisms are primarily designed to protect shareholder interests, 
which may differ from the debt holders’ interests. Prior studies show that corporate 
governance mechanisms that protect shareholders harm credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2006) as well as the price and non-price terms of the loan contract. (Chava, Livdan, & 
Purnanandam, 2009; Jiraporn, Chintrakarn, Kim, & Liu, 2013; Klock et al., 2005) find a 
positive relationship between shareholder rights and the cost of debt. Furthermore, Qi et al. 
(2011) document that firms with stronger shareholder rights have more bond covenant 
restrictions. Thus, corporate governance mechanisms that are desirable for shareholders may 
not be regarded as desirable by debt holders. 
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 Most of the above-mentioned studies focus on the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the firm’s credit rating or the price and non-price terms of the loan contract. 
Hope et al. (2011) were the first to explore the impact of a specific corporate governance 
mechanism, namely, the review of the firm’s annual financial statements by an external 
auditor, on credit access. We extend their work as follows: First, we investigate the impact of 
two different corporate governance mechanisms that may affect the conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and debt holders: (i) mechanisms aimed at mitigating agency conflicts 
between shareholders and managers (i.e. shareholder rights), and (ii) mechanisms aimed at 
mitigating conflicts between minority shareholders, controlling shareholders and managers 
(i.e. regulations on related-party transactions). Second, we analyse both the probability of 
applying for but not obtaining a loan and the probability of being discouraged from applying 
for a loan due to fear of rejection, since firms will be credit constrained in either case.  
Shareholder rights are designed to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. However, by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders more closely, 
the probability that the managers will shift wealth from the creditors to the shareholders 
increases (e.g. Ortiz-Molina, 2006). Due to this shift, the firm’s probability of defaulting on 
the bank’s loan increases. If banks observe shareholder rights, they should be able to 
anticipate the greater risk they incur because of the convergence of interests of managers and 
shareholders, at the time when the lending decision is taken. Due to the increased perceived 
risk, banks will more likely deny access to credit if the shareholder rights are strong. On the 
basis of this argument, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: The stronger are the shareholder rights, the lower is the probability that firms 
will obtain credit. 
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In addition to corporate governance mechanisms that focus primarily on the resolution 
of agency conflicts between managers and diffuse shareholders, there are also corporate 
governance mechanisms that deal with the resolution of conflicts of interests among 
managers, controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Both managers and controlling 
shareholders may expropriate minority shareholders by transferring resources from the firm 
through related-party transactions, e.g. by extracting cash from the firm by selling goods or 
services to the firm through self-dealing transactions or by obtaining loans with preferential 
terms (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Empirical evidence suggests 
that related-party transactions are associated with losses in value for minority shareholders 
(e.g., Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002.; Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2009; Cheung, Rau, & Stouraitis, 
2006). In order to reduce the agency problem involved in related-party transactions, corporate 
governance rules either aim at ensuring arm’s-length terms and conditions by regulating the 
disclosure and approval requirements or empower minority shareholders to sue those who 
expropriate and hold them liable for prejudicial related-party transactions. Further, prejudicial 
related-party transactions can be deterred through fines and criminal sanctions (Djankov, 
Hart, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2008).  
While regulations on related-party transactions reduce agency conflicts between 
minority shareholders, managers and controlling shareholders, their impact on agency 
conflicts between the shareholders and the bank is unclear. We argue that banks will be more 
likely to grant credit when more rigid corporate governance rules lead to related-party 
transactions that are at arm’s-length. This is because rules that constrain the power of 
managers and controlling shareholders in favour of minority shareholders also protect other 
stakeholders, albeit to a lesser extent. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H1b:  The stronger is the regulations on related-party transactions, the higher is the 
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probability that firms will obtain credit. 
 
However, corporate governance rules may not only impact the banks’ decision to 
grant credit, but also the firms’ decision to apply for loans. In order to increase their chances 
of success, firms will try to foresee the bank’s lending decision, since there is no point in 
investing effort into filing a loan when they know that the bank will deny it. Hence, firms will 
also try to anticipate how the corporate governance rules might affect the banks’ lending 
decision in deciding whether or not to apply for a loan. Assuming that firms’ managers are 
able to anticipate banks’ behaviour correctly, we expect there to be an increase in the 
probability of firms being discouraged from applying for loans if – as hypothesized – 
corporate governance rules reduce the probability of firms obtaining credit. In contrast, if, as 
hypothesized, corporate governance rules increase the probability of firms obtaining credit, 
we expect there to be a reduction in the probability of firms being discouraged from applying 
for loans. Thus, we formulate the following hypotheses:  
 
H1c:  The stronger are the shareholder rights, the higher is the probability that firms 
will be discouraged from applying for credit. 
H1d: The stronger is the regulations on related-party transactions, the lower is the 
probability that firms will be discouraged from applying for credit. 
 
Both shareholder rights and rules on related-party transactions represent specific 
regulations that are embedded in the respective country’s regulatory institutional setting. The 
current regulatory institutional setting is the result of historical development (Lounsbury, 
2002). It is shaped by the origin of the country’s legal system, which in the European context 
tends to be either English common law, or French, German or Scandinavian civil law 
11 
 
(Reynolds & Flores, 1989). While specific regulations vary between single countries, 
regulatory institutional settings with a common legal origin share key principles and patterns 
(La Porta et al., 1997; Wise, 1990). Thus, in order to understand the effects of specific 
regulations on business practices, higher levels of constraints and opportunities that are 
relevant to these practices need to be considered as well (Friedland & Alford, 1991). 
Moreover, the effects have to be traced across these levels (Stinchcombe, 1991). For the 
specific corporate governance regulations under investigation here, this higher level that 
contains or enables specific corporate governance regulations is the regulatory institutional 
setting (Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima, 2013). 
The country’s regulatory institutional setting is relevant in determining the effects of 
corporate governance because specific regulations will only affect business practice when 
they are applied and enforced (Sacco, 1991). More specifically, the effectiveness of specific 
regulations depends on how well they fit with the regulatory institutional settings in which 
they are embedded (Monateri, 2003). This is because all legal scholars (such as legislators, 
judges or attorneys at law) and their behaviour are embedded in the country’s institutional 
settings. Following the concept of embedded agency (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992), the 
social actors in the legal system have a common understanding of that legal system and this 
common understanding shapes the way in which they interpret, apply and further develop 
regulations. In that way, they reproduce the legal tradition and reinforce the particularities of 
the institutional setting that are rooted in its legal origin (Pistor, Keinan, Kleinheisterkamp, & 
West, 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). 
Ideally, there will be a fit between specific regulations and the regulatory institutional 
setting in which they are embedded (Thornton, 2002), as regulations are mainly developed, 
applied and enforced within the same country, and thus by legal scholars with a common 
legal background. However, this fit may be lost when regulations are developed supra-
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nationally, such as by the European Union (for examples of such regulations concerning 
corporate governance see Andenas and Kenyon-Slade, 1993), but applied and enforced 
nationally (Wise, 1990). In this case, the effectiveness of the specific regulation will depend 
on how well countries manage to adapt their national regulations to supra-national 
requirements or how well supra-national regulations are implemented in the national 
regulatory institutional setting.  
Countries’ success in ensuring a fit between specific regulations and the regulatory 
institutional setting in which they are embedded may vary (Hayek, 1960; Marryman, 1985). 
However, the better the adaptability, and consequently the fit, the more effective the specific 
regulations will be (Posner, 1973; Thornton, 2002). Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levin (2002) 
present empirical evidence that differences in the adaptability of regulatory institutional 
settings explain cross-country differences in corporate financing. More specifically, more 
effective shareholder rights and rules on related-party transactions will reduce the risks for 
banks in relation to the financing decision (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). As argued 
above, the effectiveness of these two corporate governance mechanisms will impact on both 
the probability of firms obtaining credit and the probability of firms being discouraged from 
applying for credit. On the basis of these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a:  The negative effect of shareholder rights on the probability of firms obtaining 
credit is moderated by the origin of the legal system. 
H2b: The positive effect of regulations on related-party transactions on the 
probability of firms obtaining credit is moderated by the origin of the legal 
system.  
H2c:  The positive effect of shareholder rights on the probability of firms being 
discouraged from applying for credit is moderated by the origin of the legal 
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system. 
H2d: The negative effect of regulations on related-party transactions on the 
probability of firms being discouraged from applying for credit is moderated 
by the origin of the legal system. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our analysis uses data from the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises 
(SAFE), which is run on behalf of the European Commission and the European Central Bank. 
SAFE is an on-going survey that has collected information about firms’ access to finance at 
semi-annual intervals since 2009, systematically covering at least thirteen euro area countries 
(namely Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxemburg, Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).  
The firms in the sample used by SAFE are randomly selected from the Dun & 
Bradstreet database. The sample is stratified by firm-size class, economic activity and 
country, and the sample size for each economic activity is chosen to guarantee satisfactory 
representation across the four largest activities: industry, construction, trade and services. 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, financial intermediation, public administration, activities of 
households, extra-territorial organizations, and bodies and holding companies are excluded. 
Moreover, the sample sizes are selected on the basis of representation at country level. The 
individual surveyed in each firm is a top-level executive and the questionnaire is 
administered in the local language. 
We merge the SAFE dataset with information from the quarterly Bank Lending 
Survey (BLS), which contains information about the banks’ lending in the past three months 
and the banks’ propensity to lend in the next six months. We include the observations of the 
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banks’ propensity to lend to small/medium-sized firms in the previous three months in order 
to control for credit availability in the market. We also include data from Eurostat in order to 
use homogeneous data on GDP growth, unemployment rates, inflation and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of bank concentration (HHI). Finally, data on shareholder rights and 
regulations on related-party transactions come from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
dataset on protecting minority investors.  
3.2 Methodology 
Our analysis relies on logit regression (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000), since the two 
dependent variables considered are binary. The panel dataset used is unmatched at the firm 
level. Thus, we are prevented from implementing fixed-effects panel regression that would 
have allowed us to consider the evolution of lending relationships over time at the firm level. 
Shareholder rights and regulations on related-party transactions may differ at the country 
level and with firm size. This fact could generate clustering effects on the errors of the 
regression. We therefore estimate standard errors robust to clustering of errors by considering 
39 different clusters (thirteen countries and three firm-size classes, namely micro, small and 
medium-sized firms, in each country). In addition, we estimate our regressions by including 
the weights that restore the proportions of the economic weight (in terms of the number of 
employees) of each size class, economic activity and country. 
We estimate a set of regressions, in which we enter shareholder rights and regulations 
on related-party transactions, and their interaction with legal origin. This approach avoids 
multicollinearity problems linked to the fact that the variables for shareholder rights and 
regulations on related-party transactions are correlated with each other.  
In addition, we implement a number of robustness checks. Corporate governance 
mechanisms are related to the culture of a country. Countries representing a more risk-averse 
culture tend to develop regulations that grant more protection against possible agency 
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conflicts. Our analysis could therefore suffer from endogeneity linked to the omitted variable 
of culture. In order to examine whether the results are affected by endogeneity, we instrument 
the variables for shareholder rights and regulations on related-party transactions (when they 
are statistically significant) with variables that measure the country’s culture. We find very 
good candidates in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1981, 1983). We use four 
dimensions: power distance (PD) (defined as the extent to which less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally); individualism (IND) (the degree of interdependence a society maintains among 
its members); masculinity (MAS) (whether the society is driven by competition, achievement 
and success, with success being defined by the winner/best in field); and uncertainty 
avoidance (UNC) (the way that a society deals with the fact that the future can never be 
known). We do not consider the residual two dimensions, namely indulgence (the extent to 
which people try to control their desires and impulses) and pragmatism (how people relate to 
the fact that so much of what happens around us cannot be explained), since we do not see a 
logical relationship between these dimensions and our corporate governance variables. 
Moreover, our analysis might be subject to sample selection bias, as we either use a 
dataset that includes only those firms that applied for a loan (11,332 out of 45,596) or one 
that includes only those firms that did not apply for a loan (34,264 out of 45,596). Thus, we 
re-estimate our model implementing the (Heckman, 1979) selection approach. In this case, 
we rely on the dataset that contains observations from all firms (i.e. both firms that applied 
for a loan and firms that did not apply − 45,596 observations) and employ the binary response 
model with sample selection, where the dependent variable indicates whether or not the firm 
applied for a loan. The approach we rely on is similar to the one used by Piga and Vivarelli 
(2004) and Piga and Atzeni (2007). The dataset offers a very limited choice of variables for 
the selection models. We decided to use the following variables: (i) Change in the profit of 
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the firm. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), firms finance their activity by first using 
retained profit, then reverting to debt, and using equity as a source of last resort. Thus, more 
profitable firms are more likely to be able to “self-finance” their activities and are therefore 
expected to be less likely to apply for a loan. (ii) Firm’s independence. Firms that belong to a 
group can often rely on finance provided by the holding company, and are thus expected to 
be less likely to apply for a loan. (iii) Firm’s turnover. Bigger firms need more finance for 
their on-going activities and are thus, ceteris paribus, more likely to file for a loan. We are 
aware that these variables may play a role in the bank’s lending decision or in the firm’s 
decision not to apply for a loan for fear of rejection. However, the fact that these selection 
variables have a lower correlation with the dependent variables than with the dummy variable 
that measures whether or not the firm applies for a loan, provides additional support to our 
choice. We also test alternative selection models, such as firm size in terms of employees, 
since smaller firms are more likely to avoid applying for a loan, because they need less 
finance and can easily exploit informal bootstrap finance instead of bank loans, or change in 
costs. The results obtained using these models do not differ from those obtained using our 
original selection model.  
Finally, we check whether the results are affected by the estimation approach used. In 
order to examine this potential issue, we re-estimate the regressions using probit estimation.  
3.3 Dependent variables 
In order to examine the probability of firms being denied credit, we rely on one of the 
questions asked in the SAFE, namely whether firms have obtained the credit they have 
applied for in the last six months. We use the answer to this question (the firm obtained all 
the credit = 1; the firm did not obtain the credit = 0) as our first dependent variable. 
Firms can also be credit constrained by the firm’s management deciding not to apply 
for a loan because it fears a rejection from the bank (discouraged borrowers). Thus, firms can 
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also be credit constrained due to self-selection. The SAFE dataset collects information about 
this aspect as well. It asks firms that have not applied for a loan if their decision was based on 
an expected rejection from the bank. We use the answer to this question (the firm is a 
discouraged borrower = 1; the firm is not a discouraged borrower = 0) as our second 
dependent variable. 
3.4 Independent variables 
We use two different independent variables, namely “shareholder rights” and 
“regulations on related-party transactions”. To enable international comparison, we have 
chosen a comprehensive international dataset, as called for by La Porta et al. (1998). For both 
independent variables, we rely on indices provided by the World Bank’s Doing Business 
dataset on protecting minority investors. The data in this dataset are collected by means of a 
questionnaire administered to corporate and securities lawyers and based on securities 
regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules of evidence.  
The index used for the variable “shareholder rights” is called the “Extent of 
shareholder governance index”. This index, which was introduced in the Doing Business 
2015 survey, measures shareholders’ rights in corporate governance and comprises three 
different dimensions: (i) shareholders’ rights and role in major corporate decisions, (ii) 
governance safeguards that protect shareholders from undue board control and entrenchment, 
and (iii) corporate transparency (e.g., on ownership stakes and compensation). The index 
ranges between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating stronger shareholder rights. 
The index used for the variable “regulations on related-party transactions” is called 
the “Extent of conflict of interest regulation index” and is based on a methodology developed 
by Djankov, Hart, et al. (2008) as well as Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008). It measures the protection afforded to shareholders against the risk that directors or 
controlling shareholders will misuse the firm’s assets for their personal gain, and comprises 
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three different dimensions: (i) transparency of related-party transactions, (ii) ability of 
minority shareholders to sue and hold interested parties liable for self-dealing, and (iii) access 
to evidence and allocation of legal expenses in legal disputes. Again, the index ranges 
between 0 and 10. Higher values indicate stronger regulations on related-party transactions.  
In addition, we use four dummy variables that cluster the countries according to their 
legal origin, which is based on La Porta et al. (1997).We group the surveyed countries into 
those of English origin, French origin, German origin and Scandinavian origin. Finally, as 
both shareholder rights and regulations on related-party transactions are affected by legal 
origin, we generate an interaction variable by multiplying the country coefficients for the 
dummies.  
3.5 Controls 
We include a set of controls for firm characteristics, the economic context, and the 
moment in time when the data were collected.  
As far as firm characteristics are concerned, the SAFE dataset discloses information 
about whether the firm belongs to the construction/mining, manufacturing, retailing, or 
services industry. We include three dummies in order to account for these industries. SAFE 
also includes data about the size of the firms, which are grouped into micro, small and 
medium-sized firms. We use two dummies that identify micro (MICRO) and small (SMALL) 
firms.  
Information about the age of the firm is reflected by clustering firms according to four 
age categories: younger than two years, between two and five years, between five and nine 
years, and older than nine years. We use 2_YEARS, 2_5_YEARS, and 5_9_YEARS dummy 
variables to identify the age group. Older firms are more likely to be successful in applying 
for a loan (Berger & Udell, 1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1994) since they have an established 
reputation that banks rely on when taking lending decisions (Martinelli, 1997). 
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The dataset offers a very limited choice in terms of variables that measure the 
performance of the firm. We choose the change in turnover (CHANGE_TURNOVER) and 
the change in labour costs (CHANGE_LABOUR_COSTS) in order to control for the 
performance of the firm. Both are categorical variables, which take a value of -1 if the firm 
faces a reduction in turnover or labour costs, 0 if there is no change, and +1 if there is an 
increase. 
Regarding the financial strategy of the firm, we include dummies that identify 
whether the firm has used trade credit (TRADE_CREDIT), leasing (LEASING), retained 
earnings (RETAINED_EARNINGS) or additional equity (EQUITY) during the last six 
months in order to finance its activities. 
Since the independent variables are time-invariant at a country level, we do not 
include a control for the country. However, we consider a set of macroeconomic variables 
that are country-specific and time-varying to capture the macroeconomic context in which the 
firm operates. In particular, we include the changes in the gross domestic product (GDP), 
inflation rate (INFLATION) and overall unemployment rate (UNEMPL). Moreover, we 
account for the overall financial context by using the European Central Bank’s BLS 
coefficients for small/medium-sized firms (CREDIT_ACCESS). This index measures 
whether banks applied more rigid rules for the provision of credit (positive values) or more 
lenient ones (negative values). Additionally, we consider the structure of the financial 
industry by using the HHI of bank concentration in each country, as previous research 
suggests that bank competition has an impact on credit access (Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-
Fernández, & Udell, 2009; Neuberger, Pedergnana, & Räthke-Döppner, 2008). 
 The dataset provides unmatched observations for eight semesters. Thus, we use seven 
dummies that identify the semester in which the data were collected. 
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4. Descriptive statistics 
 The dataset we use contains 45,596 complete observations from thirteen countries for 
the period between the first semester of 2009 and the second semester of 2012. The dataset is 
reduced to 11,332 observations, if only those firms that applied for a loan are considered. The 
difference can be attributed to firms that did not need finance (and thus did not apply for a 
loan) and firms that were discouraged from applying for a loan (discouraged borrowers). The 
summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The first column reports data for the entire dataset, 
the second for firms that applied for a loan and the third for firms that did not apply for a 
loan. 
 
--------------------- 
TABLE 1 HERE 
--------------------- 
 
 The majority of firms in the sample are small and well-established: 72% are either 
micro or small and more than three quarters are older than 9 years. The dominant industry is 
services (36%), followed by manufacturing (23%). Only about one third of the firms enjoyed 
an increase in turnover (34%), whereas 28% did not experience any change and 38% suffered 
from a contraction. In terms of financing, firms appear to use leasing and trade credit quite 
intensively. The BLS coefficient is +7.26, implying that, on average, credit is not readily 
available.  
 The independent variable “shareholder rights” assumes values between 0 
(Luxembourg) and 7.8 (France), the average being 5.66. Similarly, the values for our second 
independent variable “regulations on third-party transactions” ranges between 0 
(Luxembourg) and 8 (Ireland) with an average of 5.49. In order to reduce collinearity issues 
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and simplify the interpretation of the results we mean-centre the scale.  
 Moving from the overall dataset to the sub-sample that considers only those firms that 
actually applied for a loan (11,332 observations), the distribution of the firms’ ages and the 
development of their performance are very similar to those of the overall sample. In terms of 
financing, firms that apply for loans also appear to use more alternative sources of finance, 
such as trade credit (42.6%) or leasing (40.8%).  
 
5. Results 
 The analysis is split into two stages: First, we examine whether shareholder rights and 
regulations on related-party transactions affect a bank’s decision to grant a loan. Second, we 
explore whether shareholder rights and regulations on related-party transactions discourage 
firms from applying for a loan because they fear being rejected by banks.  
5.1 Bank lending decision 
The results regarding the impact of shareholder rights and regulations on related-party 
transactions on a bank’s decision to grant a loan are shown in Tables 2A and 2B.  
 
--------------- 
TABLE 2A 
--------------- 
--------------- 
TABLE 2B 
--------------- 
 
 In regression A we only enter the controls. It is highly significant and R
2
 is .0678. The 
industry dummies are significant except for SERVICES. The size of the firm affects its 
22 
 
access to credit: very small firms (MICRO) appear to be credit constrained, whereas the 
variable is not significant for slightly bigger firms (SMALL). With respect to the age of the 
firm, those between 2 and 5 years of age appear to be the least likely to obtain a loan. The 
change in labour costs (CHANGE_LABOUR_COST) is not significant. Alternative sources 
of finance are negatively related to obtaining credit, suggesting that banks are not happy to 
provide credit when firms use other sources of finance: In order of the effect, EQUITY, 
TRADE CREDIT and RETAINED_EARNINGS are all strongly negatively related to 
obtaining a loan, whereas LEASING is not significant. As expected, the European Central 
Bank’s BLS coefficient (CREDIT_ACCESS) is negatively related to credit access: the less 
prone banks are to lend, the less likely it is that firms will be successful in their loan 
applications. Economic expansion (GDP) is positively related to credit access, whereas the 
change in unemployment is negatively related.  
 Regression B includes shareholder rights (SHARE_GOV). It is significant and has an 
R
2 
of
 
.0691. RETAINED_EARNINGS becomes not significant. SHARE_GOV is not 
significant, albeit borderline. Regression C drops SHARE_GOV, but enters the interaction of 
this variable with the four legal origin clusters. The regression is significant and R
2
 improves 
to .0783. The regression does not present problems of collinearity. There are no major 
changes in the effects of the controls except for INFLATION, which becomes significant and 
negatively related to loan approval. Among the four independent variables, only 
SHARE_GOV_ENG and SHARE_GOV_GERM are significant.  
 Regression D includes the variable for regulations on related-party transactions 
(REL_PARTIES). The regression is significant and there is no change in either the R
2
 or the 
significance levels of the covariates. REL_PARTIES is not significant. In regression E we 
drop REL_PARTIES but enter the interaction of this variable with the four legal origin 
clusters. The regression is significant and the R
2
 improves to .0742. The regression does not 
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present problems of collinearity. There are no major changes in the results for the controls, 
except for INFLATION and HHI, which become significant and negatively related to loan 
approval. Among the four independent variables, only REL_PARTIES_ENG and 
REL_PARTIES_SCA are significant.  
5.2 Discouraged borrowers 
The results regarding the impact of shareholder rights and regulations on related-party 
transactions on whether the firm is discouraged from applying for a loan are reported in 
Tables 3A and 3B.  
 
--------------- 
TABLE 3A 
--------------- 
--------------- 
TABLE 3B 
--------------- 
 
In regression F we enter only the controls in order to facilitate the comparison. It is 
highly significant and R
2
 is .0282. Among the industry dummies, only MANUFACTURING 
is significant. The size of the firm affects its access to credit: very small firms (MICRO) are 
more likely to be discouraged from borrowing than small firms (SMALL). With respect to 
the age of the firm, firms between 2 and 5 years of age appear most likely to be discouraged 
from borrowing. The change in labour costs (CHANGE_LABOUR_COST) is not significant. 
The alternative sources of finance are positively related to discouragement from applying for 
credit, which suggests that firms anticipate the banks’ unwillingness to provide credit when 
they are using other sources of finance: both EQUITY and TRADE CREDIT are positively 
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related to discouragement from borrowing. Among the variables that measure the 
macroeconomic environment, only UNEMPLOYMENT is significant, and is positively 
related to discouragement from borrowing.  
 Regression G investigates the impact of shareholder rights (SHARE_GOV). It is 
significant and has an R
2
 of .0283. There are no changes in the significance levels of the 
covariates. SHARE_GOV is not significant. Regression H drops SHARE_GOV, but includes 
the interaction of this variable with the four legal origin clusters. The regression is significant 
and the R
2
 improves to .0355. The regression does not present problems of collinearity. There 
are no major changes in the results for the controls, except for RETAINED_EARNINGS, 
which becomes significant again and positively related to a firm being discouraged from 
applying for a loan. Among the four independent variables, only SHARE_GOV_ENG and 
SHARE_GOV_SCA are significant.  
 Regression I includes the variable for regulations on related-party transactions 
(REL_PARTIES). The regression is significant and R
2
 is .0285. No changes arise in the 
significance levels of the covariates. REL_PARTIES is not significant. In regression J we 
drop REL_PARTIES, but include the interaction of this variable with the four legal origin 
clusters. The regression is significant and the R
2
 improves to .0357. The regression does not 
present problems of collinearity. There are no major changes in the controls except for 
RETAINED_EARNINGS and HHI, which become significant and positively related to 
discouragement from applying for a loan. Among the four independent variables, only 
REL_PARTIES_ENG and REL_PARTIES_SCA are significant.  
5.3 Robustness checks addressing endogeneity 
The analyses presented so far provide clear results. Nevertheless, some additional 
robustness checks are needed before we comment on the results. 
As discussed in the methodology section, the shareholder rights and regulations on 
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related-party transactions are embedded in a country’s regulatory institutional settings and 
widely affected by the country’s culture. In fact, we already include legal origin in our 
analyses by clustering the observations according to their legal origin (English, Scandinavian, 
German or French). However, it could be argued that what we are measuring is actually a 
reflection of the country’s culture and not two of its corporate governance mechanisms. In 
this case, our results could be affected by endogeneity in terms of omitted variables. In order 
to examine this issue, we re-estimate the regressions with significant independent variables 
by instrumenting them with Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, Neuijen, Daval, & 
Geert, 1990; Hofstede, 1981, 1983), i.e. power distance (PD), individualism (IND), 
masculinity (MAS), and uncertainty avoidance (UNC). These instrumenting variables also 
appear to be very good candidates from an econometric point of view, since they show a high 
correlation with our independent variables: All Pearson’s correlation coefficients are between 
+/-.20 and +.55 and significant, except for IND, which presents weaker correlations of 
approximately +/-.10. At the same time, the correlation of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
with the dependent variables (i.e., loan obtained and being discouraged from applying for a 
loan) is weak (below +.05 and in many cases not significant). 
If the interactions between shareholder rights and regulations on related-party 
transactions on the one hand and legal origin on the other hand in fact measure culture, we 
should end up with instrumented variables that are significant. The results are reported in 
Tables 4 (loan obtained) and 5 (discouraged from applying for a loan). 
 
--------------- 
TABLE 4 
--------------- 
--------------- 
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TABLE 5 
--------------- 
 
In the loan obtained case, we enter the variables that were significant in our original 
regression C as well as those that were significant in regression E simultaneously. In both 
regression C instrumented and regression E instrumented, the instrumented independent 
variables are not significant. This finding is reassuring, as it suggests that our independent 
variables in regression C and E were in fact measuring the interaction between the respective 
corporate governance mechanism and legal origin and not the country’s culture. The 
regressions presented in Table 5 examine the same issue for discouraged borrowers. In 
regression H instrumented and regression J instrumented, as well, the instrumented 
independent variables are not significant, suggesting that there is no problem with 
endogeneity. These findings are in line with those of Beck and Lavine (2003), who also 
found the effects of legal origin to be robust regarding aspects of national culture. 
5.4 Robustness checks addressing selection bias 
In the second robustness check, we investigate whether our results are affected by 
sample selection bias. In order to deal with this issue, we re-estimate the regressions by 
relying on the Heckman sample selection model (Heckman, 1979). We model the selection 
process using variables that measure the change in profitability, the change in turnover and 
whether the firm belongs to a group. In this case we rely on 44,816 observations: the missing 
780 observation are linked to missing values for the variables used in the selection process 
(i.e. INDEPENDENT, CHANGE_PROFIT and CHANGE_TURNOVER). Detailed results 
are not reported here.  
As far as the loan obtained analysis is concerned, all regressions are significant and 
there are no major changes in the signs or significance levels of the controls. Regarding the 
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dependent variables, SHARE_GOV becomes significant (it was not significant before, but 
only marginally), whereas Scandinavian origin becomes insignificant when included in the 
regression with CONFLICT_INTEREST. Neither change is completely unexpected, as both 
covariates were borderline in the original regressions. 
As far as discouraged borrowers are concerned, there are no major changes in the 
controls or the independent variables with regard to the regressions presented above. The 
only change concerns SCA, when it is entered with SHARE_GOV. This change is not 
completely unexpected, as the variable was previously significant (even if very borderline) 
and becomes insignificant in the regression with the Heckman selection process. 
As discussed, we also re-test the regressions using alternative selection processes. 
However, we obtain very stable results with respect to those reported in Tables 2A, 2B, 3A 
and 3B. All in all, the robustness checks addressing selection bias confirm our previous 
findings. 
5.5 Robustness checks regarding alternative approaches 
Finally, we re-estimate the regressions using a different econometric approach, 
namely probit regression instead of the original logit regression. This allows us to explore 
whether our results are sensitive to the econometric approach used in our estimations. 
Detailed results are not reported here. However, there is no change in either the significance 
or the sign of the variables entered in the regression. 
All in all, the results of the robustness checks suggest that our original findings are 
robust to sample selection, alternative regressions, alternative independent variables and 
different estimation techniques. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
In this cross-European study, we investigate the role of two specific corporate 
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governance mechanisms (i.e. shareholder rights and regulations on related-party transactions) 
in firms’ decision to apply for credit and the banks’ lending decision. Further, we argue that 
the impact of these two specific corporate governance regulations on firms’ credit access is 
contingent upon the regulatory institutional setting in which they are embedded. Thus, we 
account for the legal origin that shapes countries’ regulatory institutional settings. 
Regarding the impact of the two corporate governance mechanisms on the banks’ 
lending decision, we find mixed results. For the banks’ lending decision, the governance 
aspect of "shareholder rights", as such, is irrelevant. A more fine-grained look reveals that 
strong shareholder rights enhance the likelihood of firms obtaining credit in the English and 
German legal traditions. Hence, the origin of the regulatory institutional setting is decisive for 
the impact shareholder rights have on the banks’ lending decision. 
The governance aspect of "regulations on related-party transactions" does not directly 
impact banks' lending decisions either. However, in the English legal tradition, strong 
protection of minority shareholders significantly diminishes firms’ chances of a positive 
lending decision by a bank, whereas the interaction term is positive in the Scandinavian legal 
tradition, suggesting that strong protection of minority shareholders in settings shaped by the 
Scandinavian legal tradition enhances firms’ chances of a positive lending decision from a 
bank. 
Turning the attention to the impact of the two corporate governance mechanisms on 
the firms’ decision to apply for a loan, we do not find direct effects from either “shareholder 
rights” or “regulations on related-party transactions”. However, our analysis reveals 
significant effects when the legal origin of the regulatory institutional setting is considered. 
We find that strong shareholder rights vis-à-vis a firm’s management increases its likelihood 
of applying for a loan in the English tradition and decreases it in the Scandinavian tradition.  
Regarding the impact of the corporate governance aspect of "regulations on related-
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party transactions" on firms' decision to apply for a loan, we also uncover interesting results 
in the English and Scandinavian legal traditions. In the English legal tradition, tight 
regulations on related-party transactions decrease the likelihood of firms applying for loans. 
On the contrary, in the Scandinavian legal tradition, tight regulations on related-party 
transactions enhance the likelihood of firms applying for loans.  
Overall, our empirical findings support our arguments that the legal origin of the 
regulatory institutional environment matters both for the banks' lending decision and the 
firms' decision to apply for a loan. However, corporate governance mechanisms that address 
the risk of firms’ management cheating the shareholders and the risk of the controlling 
shareholders cheating the minority shareholders do not directly influence the banks' or the 
firms' credit decisions. Rather, the impact of corporate governance on firms’ credit access 
unfolds in regulatory institutional contexts shaped by specific legal traditions only.  
For regulatory institutional settings with a German legal tradition, the results are 
straightforward: stronger protection of shareholder rights enhances firms’ chances of 
receiving a positive lending decision from a bank. However, firms do not anticipate this 
positive effect in their decision to apply for a loan. These empirical findings are in contrast to 
our expectation derived from earlier studies (e.g., Chava et al., 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2013; 
Klock et al., 2005; Ortiz-Molina, 2006). Still, accounting for the regulatory institutional 
setting in which the corporate governance mechanisms are embedded resolves what, at first 
sight, looks like a contradiction. La Porta et al. (1998) find that countries with a German legal 
tradition are more successful in adapting their laws, and thus in securing the fit between 
specific regulations and their regulatory institutional environment. They also identify the 
German legal tradition as the institutional context in which law enforcement is the strongest. 
Hay, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) argue that, in institutional settings with a well-functioning 
enforcement of the law, more flexible regulation is superior. Flexible rules provide more 
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room to the parties involved to design contracts according to their specific needs. In sum, 
these characteristics provide a fertile ground for the positive effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms to unfold in regulatory institutional settings with a German legal tradition. 
However, the countries with a German legal tradition are also characterized by the 
comparatively lowest ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1998). Thus, due to the small 
number of firms with controlling shareholders, who potentially compromise the interests of 
minority shareholders, the impact of strong regulations on related-party transactions is limited 
in such contexts. Banks seem to recognize the particularities of settings with a German legal 
tradition when it comes to the interaction between specific corporate governance mechanism 
and the regulatory institutional setting. 
Regarding the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ access to finance, 
the regulatory institutional settings with English and Scandinavian legal origins represent the 
flipsides of the same coin. Strong protection of shareholder rights and weak regulations on 
third-party transactions in settings shaped by the English legal tradition make a positive bank 
lending decision more likely. Firms correctly anticipate the relevance of the context for the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the banks’ lending decision. The results for 
the Scandinavian legal tradition show nearly the inverse picture. These findings on the one 
hand partially contradict our expectation that banks will be more likely to grant credit when 
shareholders are protected from opportunistic managers and when more rigid corporate 
governance rules lead to related-party transactions that are at arm’s-length. On the other 
hand, they underpin our claim of the relevance of the regulatory institutional setting and its 
legal origin. These two legal traditions produce quite different regulatory institutional 
settings. Compared to settings with a Scandinavian legal tradition, in settings with an English 
legal tradition, the quality of law enforcement and accounting have been found to be 
considerably lower, while the law has been found to be more adaptable (La Porta et al., 
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1998). It can be argued that, due to its high adaptability, there is a good fit between specific 
corporate governance mechanisms and the regulatory institutional setting in economies with 
an English legal tradition, which makes strong shareholder rights functional for investors 
(Bailey & Rubin, 1994) as well as creditors, due to the reduced risk they incur. Further, banks 
in countries with a low concentration of ownership, such as countries with English origin (La 
Porta et al., 1998), might prefer it if shareholders speak with one strong voice. At the same 
time, a lower quality of accounting in the English legal tradition might diminish the 
effectiveness of transparency rules aimed at protecting minority shareholders. A lower quality 
of law enforcement in the English legal tradition might further weaken the effectiveness of 
such specific corporate governance mechanisms as it will reduce the credibility of minority 
shareholders’ sanctioning power (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987). Thus, the differences between 
the regulatory institutional settings shaped by the English and Scandinavian legal traditions 
provide plausible explanations of our findings. In both settings, firms anticipate the impact of 
the prevailing governance mechanisms on banks’ lending decisions.  
Finally, in the regulatory institutional settings that are rooted in the French legal 
origin, specific corporate governance mechanisms impact neither the banks’ credit decision, 
nor the firms’ decision to apply for credit. As these settings are characterized by the 
comparatively lowest adaptability, the specific regulations do not fit the regulatory 
institutional setting and are ineffective due to these settings’ comparatively lowest quality of 
law enforcement and accounting. La Porta et al. (1998) report a remarkably high ownership 
concentration for settings with a French legal tradition. High concentration of ownership can 
be interpreted as a strategy for reducing the agency and information risk between 
shareholders and managers in settings with weak corporate governance regulations (La Porta 
et al., 1998). The rationale behind this argument is that large shareholders can monitor 
management more effectively and crowd out minority shareholders who do not have such 
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monitoring capacities. As a result, in contexts such as those shaped by the French legal 
tradition, corporate governance mechanisms become irrelevant to investors (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986).  
The practical implications of our findings are straightforward and far-reaching. They 
imply that economies with a well-designed governance regime regarding shareholder 
protection can influence firms’ access to bank finance, and thus innovation and economic 
growth, in a favourable way (King & Lavine, 1993; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Our results call 
for corporate governance regimes that account for the embeddedness in the specific 
regulatory institutional setting. Legislators need to ensure a flexible adoption of specific 
regulations, which are, for example, imposed by supra-national entities on national regulatory 
environments rooted in English, Scandinavian, German, or French legal origins.  
 With our findings we contribute to a vivid stream of research on the impact of the law 
on access to finance, in several ways. First, we extend the investigation of the direct effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms and the regulatory institutional setting on firms’ access to 
external finance – as pursued by La Porta et al. in their seminal studies (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silvanes, & Shleifer, 2013; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) and further developed by Hope et al. 
(2011) with a focus on bank finance – by tracing the effects across these two levels through 
the inclusion of interaction terms in our regression models. We stress the importance of 
accounting for indirect effects of corporate governance measures as also highlighted by the 
findings by Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson (2008). In that way, we are able to test 
for the effects of specific corporate governance mechanisms embedded in the regulatory 
institutional setting and gain a more comprehensive insight into the interplay of the two levels 
of analysis. Second, our analysis builds on a systematic dataset that merges data comprising 
consistent information on corporate governance mechanisms for 13 European countries with 
representative firm-level data comprising over 45,000 observations. With this rich empirical 
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basis we break new ground by tapping the full potential of a more fine-grained analysis with 
a more holistic perspective as called for by Filatotchev and Nakajima (2010). 
 In interpreting the results presented in this paper, the limitations linked to the imposed 
topical and geographical focus of the study, the underlying data, and the method applied have 
to be kept in mind. Without replicating this study in other geographical contexts and with 
other corporate governance variables, we cannot claim generalizability to other areas. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings advance the understanding of the role of 
corporate governance in bank lending and provide rich insights for research, business practice 
and legislators. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
“Entire Sample” reports the statistics for all observations included in the analysis. “Applying firms” 
reports the statistics for the sub-sample of firms that applied for a loan (whether granted or not by the 
bank). “Not applying firms” reports the statistics for the sub-sample of firms that did not apply for a 
loan, either because they did not need one or because they self-selected not to apply. 
 
 
 
  
Obs mean std.dev. min max Obs mean std.dev. min max Obs mean std.dev. min max
Loan_application 45,596 0.2485 0.4322 0 1
Discouraged_Borrowers 45,596 0.0648 0.2462 0 1 34,264 0.0862 0.2807 0 1
Loan_Obtained 45,596 0.1617 0.3682 0 1 11,332 0.6508 0.4768 0 1
Construction 45,596 0.1317 0.3382 0 1 11,332 0.1433 0.3504 0 1 34,264 0.1279 0.3340 0 1
Manufacturing 45,596 0.2269 0.4188 0 1 11,332 0.2653 0.4415 0 1 34,264 0.2141 0.4102 0 1
Services 45,596 0.3596 0.4799 0 1 11,332 0.3223 0.4674 0 1 34,264 0.3720 0.4833 0 1
Micro 45,596 0.3595 0.4799 0 1 11,332 0.2689 0.4434 0 1 34,264 0.3894 0.4876 0 1
Small 45,596 0.3629 0.4808 0 1 11,332 0.3803 0.4855 0 1 34,264 0.3571 0.4792 0 1
<2years 45,596 0.0225 0.1483 0 1 11,332 0.0229 0.1494 0 1 34,264 0.0224 0.1479 0 1
2 to 5 years 45,596 0.0842 0.2776 0 1 11,332 0.0753 0.2638 0 1 34,264 0.0871 0.2820 0 1
5 to 9 years 45,596 0.1403 0.3473 0 1 11,332 0.1309 0.3373 0 1 34,264 0.1434 0.3505 0 1
Change_Turnover 45,596 -0.0468 0.8425 -1 1 11,332 -0.0440 0.8634 -1 1 34,264 -0.0477 0.8355 -1 1
Change_Labour_cost 45,596 0.2592 0.7292 -1 1 11,332 0.2671 0.7512 -1 1 34,264 0.2566 0.7217 -1 1
Retained_earnings 45,596 0.3113 0.4630 0 1 11,332 0.3512 0.4774 0 1 34,264 0.2981 0.4574 0 1
Trade_credit 45,596 0.3361 0.4724 0 1 11,332 0.4263 0.4946 0 1 34,264 0.3063 0.4610 0 1
Leasing 45,596 0.3243 0.4681 0 1 11,332 0.4086 0.4916 0 1 34,264 0.2964 0.4567 0 1
Equity 45,596 0.0590 0.2357 0 1 11,332 0.0704 0.2559 0 1 34,264 0.0553 0.2285 0 1
Credit_Access 45,596 7.2614 10.4131 -14 60 11,332 7.0479 9.5058 -14 60 34,264 7.3320 10.6955 -14 60
GDP 45,596 -0.5176 2.9150 -8.5 4 11,332 -0.7811 2.9000 -8.5 4 34,264 -0.4304 2.9148 -8.5 4
Inflation 45,596 1.9167 1.2054 -1.7 4.7 11,332 1.8904 1.2134 -1.7 4.7 34,264 1.9254 1.2027 -1.7 4.7
Unempl_Overall 45,596 10.9578 5.7537 3.25 25.7 11,332 11.5299 5.7975 3.25 25.7 34,264 10.7686 5.7267 3.25 25.7
HHI 45,596 0.0890 0.0774 0.02 0.37 11,332 0.0761 0.0636 0.02 0.37 34,264 0.0933 0.0810 0.02 0.37
pd 45,596 40.5445 16.9993 0 61 11,332 43.3208 15.9582 0 61 34,264 39.6263 17.2320 0 61
ind 45,596 66.4785 17.2641 25 87 11,332 66.2654 16.8274 25 87 34,264 66.5490 17.4058 25 87
mas 45,596 51.5226 19.6893 10 82 11,332 53.0496 17.4788 10 82 34,264 51.0175 20.3427 10 82
unc 45,596 66.6570 17.5847 26 100 11,332 69.3548 15.4684 26 100 34,264 65.7647 18.1427 26 100
Rel_Parties 45,596 0.00        0.8225   -1.395 2.605 11,332 -0.0198 0.6983 -1.395 2.6 34,264 0.0065 0.8596 -1.395 2.6
Share_Gov 45,596 0.00        0.8560   -1.806 1.028 11,332 0.1765 0.8004 -1.806 1.03 34,264 -0.0584 0.8657 -1.806 1.03
Entire Sample Applying firms Not Applying firms
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Table 2A Obtaining credit – Shareholder rights 
Dependent Variable: Whether or not the bank provided the loan; Independent Variables: Industry 
(Construction, Manufacturing, Services), Firm characteristics (dummy variables for Micro and Small 
firms); Age of the firm (dummy variables for younger than 2 years, between 2 and 5 years, between 5 
and 9 years); Firm performance (categorical variable on the change in labour costs); Firm sources of 
finance (dummy variables for Retained earnings, Trade credit, Leasing and Equity); Macroeconomic 
controls (Credit access, GDP, Inflation, Unemployment and HHI); Shareholder rights and their 
interaction with German, English, Scandinavian and French origin; dummy variables for French, 
English and Scandinavian origin. 
 
 
** sig .05; *** sig .01  
Number of obs 11,332 Number of obs 11,332 Number of obs 11,332
Wald chi2(24) 2951.84 Wald chi2(25) 7187.14 Wald chi2(28) 19883.51
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0678 Pseudo R2 0.0691 Pseudo R2 0.0783
Loan Obtained Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0
Construction 0.3086-   0.0814   *** 0.3208-   0.0798   *** 0.3369-   0.0820   ***
Manufacturing 0.1960-   0.0674   *** 0.1956-   0.0667   *** 0.2182-   0.0673   ***
Services 0.0761-   0.0510   0.0794-   0.0511   0.0775-   0.0522   
Micro 0.6689-   0.1989   *** 0.6735-   0.1923   *** 0.6808-   0.1778   ***
Small 0.2374-   0.1929   0.2433-   0.1898   0.2451-   0.1698   
<2years 0.0318-   0.1368   0.0916-   0.1306   0.0940-   0.1330   
2_5years 0.4055-   0.0838   *** 0.4234-   0.0805   *** 0.4011-   0.0738   ***
5_9years 0.1831-   0.0670   *** 0.1905-   0.0711   *** 0.1850-   0.0737   ***
Change_Labour_cost 0.0615   0.0541   0.0544   0.0520   0.0446   0.0508   
Retained_earnings 0.1303-   0.0635   ** 0.1158-   0.0655   0.1307-   0.0688   
Trade_credit 0.2088-   0.0829   ** 0.2041-   0.0820   ** 0.1755-   0.0789   **
Leasing 0.0129   0.0709   0.0167   0.0708   0.0089   0.0715   
Equity 0.3599-   0.1006   *** 0.3378-   0.0965   *** 0.3832-   0.0971   ***
Wave
Credit_Acc 0.0110-   0.0045   ** 0.0092-   0.0049   * 0.0101-   0.0046   **
GDP 0.0978   0.0164   *** 0.0935   0.0166   *** 0.1081   0.0148   ***
Inflation 0.0944-   0.0517   0.0888-   0.0501   0.1396-   0.0514   ***
Unemployment 0.0554-   0.0088   *** 0.0627-   0.0101   *** 0.0644-   0.0104   ***
HHI 2.1537-   1.7679   0.2982-   2.1974   1.4080   2.5108   
Share_Gov 0.2063   0.1302   
Share_Gov_germ 1.3068   0.3413   ***
Share_Gov_eng 1.7394   0.3607   ***
Share_Gov_sca 0.3988-   0.4073   
Share_Gov_fra_sou 0.1637   0.1262   
_cons 2.5799   0.3026   *** 2.4521   0.3207   *** 2.5431   0.3189   ***
Regression A
Included in the regression
Regression CRegression B
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Table 2B Obtaining credit – Regulations on related-party transactions 
Dependent Variable: Whether or not the bank provided the loan; Independent Variables: Industry 
(Construction, Manufacturing, Services), Firm characteristics (dummy variables for Micro and Small 
firms); Age of the firm (dummy variables for younger than 2 years, between 2 and 5 years, between 5 
and 9 years); Firm performance (categorical variable on the change in labour costs); Firm sources of 
finance (dummy variables for Retained earnings, Trade credit, Leasing and Equity), Macroeconomic 
controls (Credit access, GDP, Inflation, Unemployment and HHI); Regulations on related-party 
transactions and their interaction with German, English, Scandinavian and French origin; dummy 
variables for French, English and Scandinavian origin. 
 
 
** sig .05; *** sig .01  
Number of obs 11,332 Number of obs 11,332 Number of obs 11,332
Wald chi2(24) 2951.84 Wald chi2(25) 3291.19 Wald chi2(28) 18614.34
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0678 Pseudo R2 0.0678 Pseudo R2 0.0742
Loan Obtained Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0
Construction 0.3086-   0.0814   *** 0.3088-   0.0806   *** 0.3532-   0.0791   ***
Manufacturing 0.1960-   0.0674   *** 0.1962-   0.0677   *** 0.2355-   0.0688   ***
Services 0.0761-   0.0510   0.0761-   0.0509   0.0858-   0.0530   
Micro 0.6689-   0.1989   *** 0.6692-   0.2007   *** 0.6894-   0.2061   ***
Small 0.2374-   0.1929   0.2376-   0.1933   0.2447-   0.1962   
<2years 0.0318-   0.1368   0.0319-   0.1367   0.0468-   0.1353   
2_5years 0.4055-   0.0838   *** 0.4055-   0.0832   *** 0.4176-   0.0804   ***
5_9years 0.1831-   0.0670   *** 0.1833-   0.0679   *** 0.1865-   0.0714   ***
Change_Labour_cost 0.0615   0.0541   0.0614   0.0533   0.0543   0.0514   
Retained_earnings 0.1303-   0.0635   ** 0.1300-   0.0650   ** 0.1373-   0.0698   **
Trade_credit 0.2088-   0.0829   ** 0.2092-   0.0852   ** 0.1938-   0.0810   **
Leasing 0.0129   0.0709   0.0132   0.0714   0.0127   0.0689   
Equity 0.3599-   0.1006   *** 0.3598-   0.1008   *** 0.3521-   0.0943   ***
Wave
Credit_Acc 0.0110-   0.0045   ** 0.0110-   0.0045   ** 0.0090-   0.0045   **
GDP 0.0978   0.0164   *** 0.0980   0.0146   *** 0.1068   0.0180   ***
Inflation 0.0944-   0.0517   0.0944-   0.0519   0.1380-   0.0544   **
Unemployment 0.0554-   0.0088   *** 0.0553-   0.0095   *** 0.0560-   0.0149   ***
HHI 2.1537-   1.7679   2.1572-   1.8199   4.6505-   1.5348   ***
Rel_Parties 0.0032   0.1206   
Rel_Parties_germ 0.2254   0.2722   
Rel_Parties_eng 0.2853-   0.0713   ***
Rel_Parties_sca 8.3838   1.6169   ***
Rel_Parties_fra_sou 0.0212   0.2136   
_cons 2.5799   0.3026   *** 2.5804   0.3020   *** 2.8594   0.3956   ***
Included in the regression
Regression A Regression D Regression E
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Table 3A Discouraged borrower – Shareholder rights 
Dependent Variable: Whether or not the firm is a discouraged borrower; Independent Variables: 
Industry (Construction, Manufacturing, Services), Firm characteristics (dummy variables for Micro 
and Small firms); Age of the firm (dummy variables for younger than 2 years, between 2 and 5 years, 
between 5 and 9 years); Firm performance (categorical variable on the change in labour costs); Firm 
sources of finance (dummy variables for Retained earnings, Trade credit, Leasing and Equity), 
Macroeconomic controls (Credit access, GDP, Inflation, Unemployment and HHI); Shareholder rights 
and their interaction with German, English, Scandinavian and French origin; dummy variables for 
French, English and Scandinavian origin 
 
 
** sig .05; *** sig .01  
Number of obs 34,264 Number of obs 34,264 Number of obs 34,264
Wald chi2(24) 9224.44 Wald chi2(25) 19264.42 Wald chi2(28) 19367.52
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0282 Pseudo R2 0.0283 Pseudo R2 0.0355
Discouraged Borrowers Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0
Construction 0.1746   0.1051   0.1754   0.1056   0.1975   0.1040   
Manufacturing 0.2285   0.0702   *** 0.2287   0.0697   *** 0.2573   0.0690   ***
Services 0.0467   0.0703   0.0466   0.0703   0.0498   0.0703   
Micro 0.6995   0.1001   *** 0.7001   0.1020   *** 0.7127   0.0865   ***
Small 0.3089   0.0931   *** 0.3092   0.0952   *** 0.3205   0.0745   ***
<2years 0.2120   0.1409   0.2227   0.1476   0.2115   0.1534   
2_5years 0.4601   0.0828   *** 0.4641   0.0820   *** 0.4442   0.0850   ***
5_9years 0.2408   0.0550   *** 0.2426   0.0548   *** 0.2383   0.0552   ***
Change_Labour_cost 0.0151-   0.0364   0.0137-   0.0368   0.0050-   0.0366   
Retained_earnings 0.1205   0.0799   0.1201   0.0802   0.1601   0.0729   **
Trade_credit 0.2887   0.1161   ** 0.2885   0.1156   ** 0.2699   0.1155   **
Leasing 0.0885   0.0583   0.0873   0.0593   0.1067   0.0588   
Equity 0.3266   0.1242   *** 0.3236   0.1275   *** 0.3646   0.1236   ***
Wave
Credit_Acc 0.0038   0.0029   0.0035   0.0027   0.0031   0.0025   
GDP 0.0294   0.0289   0.0301   0.0283   0.0256   0.0208   
Inflation 0.0602-   0.0354   0.0596-   0.0340   0.0142-   0.0411   
Unemployment 0.0443   0.0052   *** 0.0458   0.0064   *** 0.0427   0.0061   ***
HHI 1.0615   1.2904   0.6829   1.6172   2.8188   1.9837   
Share_Gov 0.0451-   0.1019   
Share_Gov_germ 0.1853-   0.2583   
Share_Gov_eng 0.8150-   0.3450   **
Share_Gov_sca 1.7066   0.4432   ***
Share_Gov_fra_sou 0.0667   0.0945   
_cons 3.6710-   0.1331   *** 3.6508-   0.1478   *** 3.9061-   0.0986   ***
Regression HRegression F
Included in the regression
Regression G
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Table 3B Discouraged borrower – Regulations on related-party transactions 
Dependent Variable: Whether or not the firm is a discouraged borrower; Independent Variables: 
Industry (Construction, Manufacturing, Services), Firm characteristics (dummy variables for Micro 
and Small firms); Age of the firm (dummy variables for younger than 2 years, between 2 and 5 years, 
between 5 and 9 years); Firm performance (categorical variable on the change in labour costs); Firm 
sources of finance (dummy variables for Retained earnings, Trade credit, Leasing and Equity), 
Macroeconomic controls (Credit access, GDP, Inflation, Unemployment and HHI); Regulations on 
related-party transactions and their interaction with German, English, Scandinavian and French origin; 
dummy variables for French, English and Scandinavian origin 
 
 
** sig .05; *** sig .01  
Number of obs 34,264 Number of obs 34,264 Number of obs 34,264
Wald chi2(24) 9224.44 Wald chi2(25) 10482.77 Wald chi2(28) 21547.33
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0282 Pseudo R2 0.0285 Pseudo R2 0.0357
Discouraged Borrowers Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0
Construction 0.1746   0.1051   0.1775   0.1058   0.2081   0.1060   
Manufacturing 0.2285   0.0702   *** 0.2317   0.0704   *** 0.2665   0.0697   ***
Services 0.0467   0.0703   0.0484   0.0706   0.0526   0.0710   
Micro 0.6995   0.1001   *** 0.7066   0.0985   *** 0.7240   0.0788   ***
Small 0.3089   0.0931   *** 0.3113   0.0913   *** 0.3233   0.0669   ***
<2years 0.2120   0.1409   0.2083   0.1410   0.2230   0.1468   
2_5years 0.4601   0.0828   *** 0.4541   0.0845   *** 0.4512   0.0844   ***
5_9years 0.2408   0.0550   *** 0.2396   0.0552   *** 0.2425   0.0530   ***
Change_Labour_cost 0.0151-   0.0364   0.0145-   0.0366   0.0023-   0.0372   
Retained_earnings 0.1205   0.0799   0.1171   0.0802   0.1488   0.0726   **
Trade_credit 0.2887   0.1161   ** 0.3040   0.1173   *** 0.2818   0.1118   **
Leasing 0.0885   0.0583   0.0812   0.0579   0.0908   0.0604   
Equity 0.3266   0.1242   *** 0.3246   0.1244   *** 0.3387   0.1237   ***
Wave
Credit_Acc 0.0038   0.0029   0.0042   0.0028   0.0031   0.0027   
GDP 0.0294   0.0289   0.0266   0.0283   0.0260   0.0219   
Inflation 0.0602-   0.0354   0.0643-   0.0388   0.0019-   0.0419   
Unemployment 0.0443   0.0052   *** 0.0440   0.0056   *** 0.0398   0.0108   ***
HHI 1.0615   1.2904   1.0601   1.2091   3.1914   0.6698   ***
Rel_Parties 0.0720-   0.0870   
Rel_Parties_germ 0.1270-   0.1865   
Rel_Parties_eng 0.1646   0.0580   ***
Rel_Parties_sca 10.7309- 1.9486   ***
Rel_Parties_fra_sou 0.1879-   0.1639   
_cons 3.6710-   0.1331   *** 3.6926-   0.1463   *** 3.9245-   0.1997   ***
Included in the regression
Regression F Regression I Regression J
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Table 4 Instrumented regression – Obtaining credit 
Dependent Variable: Whether or not the bank provided the loan; Independent Variables: Industry 
(Construction, Manufacturing, Services); Firm characteristics (dummy variables for Micro and Small 
firms); Age of the firm (dummy variables for younger than 2 years, between 2 and 5 years, between 5 
and 9 years); Firm performance (categorical variable on the change in labour costs); Firm sources of 
finance (dummy variables for Retained earnings, Trade credit, Leasing and Equity), Macroeconomic 
controls (Credit access, GDP, Inflation, Unemployment and HHI); Instrumented variables: 
Regulations on related-party transactions interacted with Scandinavian and English origin and 
Shareholder rights interacted with German and English origin. 
 
 
** sig .05; *** sig .01  
Number of obs 11,332 Number of obs 11,332
Wald chi2(26) 3033.48 Wald chi2(26) 3605.92
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
Loan Obtained Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0
Share_Gov_eng _IV 0.0960 0.3528
Share_Gov_germ_IV 1.5035 0.8517
Rel_Parties_sca_IV -13.3511 10.6711
Rel_Parties_eng_IV 0.2905 0.4284
Construction -0.1942 0.0505 *** -0.1292 0.0718
Manufacturing -0.1298 0.0413 *** -0.0659 0.0532
Services -0.0464 0.0307 -0.0273 0.0331
Micro -0.4143 0.1158 *** -0.3811 0.1301 ***
Small -0.1480 0.1091 -0.1412 0.1272
<2years -0.0383 0.0829 -0.0330 0.0750
2_5years -0.2542 0.0468 *** -0.2251 0.0604 ***
5_9years -0.1140 0.0413 *** -0.1198 0.0383 ***
Change_Labour_cost 0.0366 0.0314 0.0395 0.0305
Retained_earnings -0.0795 0.0375 ** -0.0309 0.0503
Trade_credit -0.1146 0.0486 ** -0.1508 0.0551 ***
Leasing -0.0008 0.0445 0.0225 0.0370
Equity -0.2124 0.0605 *** -0.1891 0.0584 ***
Wave
Credit_Acc -0.0075 0.0026 *** -0.0107 0.0037 ***
GDP 0.0587 0.0087 *** 0.0540 0.0147 ***
Inflation -0.0845 0.0388 ** -0.0180 0.0374
Unemployment -0.0342 0.0052 *** -0.0365 0.0072 ***
HHI -0.6639 0.8501 3.6152 3.8298
_cons 1.6053 0.1764 *** 1.2273 0.2926 ***
Regression C instrumented Regression E instrumented
Included in the regression
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Table 5 Instrumented regression – Discouraged borrower 
Dependent Variable: Whether or not the firm is a discouraged borrower; Independent Variables: 
Industry (Construction, Manufacturing, Services); Firm characteristics (dummy variables for Micro 
and Small firms); Age of the firm (dummy variables for younger than 2 years, between 2 and 5 years, 
between 5 and 9 years); Firm performance (categorical variables on the change in labour costs); Firm 
sources of finance (dummy variables for Retained earnings, Trade credit, Leasing and Equity), 
Macroeconomic controls (Credit access, GDP, Inflation, Unemployment and HHI); Instrumented 
variables: Regulations on related-party transactions interacted with Scandinavian and English origin 
and Shareholder rights interacted with Scandinavian and English origin. 
 
 
** sig .05; *** sig .01  
Number of obs 34,264.0 Number of obs 34,264.0
Wald chi2(26) 16,667.0 Wald chi2(26) 17,152.6
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
Discouraged Borrowers Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0 Coeff
Robust 
Std.Err. p<0
Share_Gov_eng_IV 0.4587-   0.8588   
Share_Gov_sca_IV 0.8323   0.4584   
Rel_Parties_eng_IV 0.0794   0.1512   
Rel_Parties_sca_IV 4.9998-   2.7181   
Construction 0.1028   0.0580   0.1027   0.0579   
Manufacturing 0.1289   0.0360   *** 0.1287   0.0359   ***
Services 0.0257   0.0351   0.0257   0.0351   
Micro 0.3529   0.0420   *** 0.3529   0.0418   ***
Small 0.1525   0.0346   *** 0.1525   0.0345   ***
<2years 0.1120   0.0733   0.1117   0.0733   
2_5years 0.2429   0.0426   *** 0.2428   0.0426   ***
5_9years 0.1244   0.0293   *** 0.1242   0.0293   ***
Change_Labour_cost 0.0020-   0.0170   0.0019-   0.0170   
Retained_earnings 0.0795   0.0395   ** 0.0794   0.0394   **
Trade_credit 0.1386   0.0638   ** 0.1390   0.0635   **
Leasing 0.0563   0.0313   0.0561   0.0312   
Equity 0.1804   0.0620   *** 0.1801   0.0620   ***
Wave
Credit_Acc 0.0010   0.0013   0.0010   0.0013   
GDP 0.0169   0.0091   0.0169   0.0091   
Inflation 0.0083-   0.0336   0.0088-   0.0327   
Unemployment 0.0222   0.0023   *** 0.0222   0.0023   ***
HHI 1.7593   0.9098   1.7533   0.8954   **
_cons 2.1313-   0.0877   *** 2.1299-   0.0857   ***
Regression J instrumentedRegression H instrumented
Included in the regression
